Abstract-This paper proposes an identity based key agreement protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) between users of different networks with independent private key generations (PKGs). Instead of bilinear pairings which commonly used for contracting identity based schemes, the proposed protocol makes use of elliptic curves to obtain more computational efficiency. The proposed protocol develops Cao et al's protocol for situations that two users of independent organizations or networks with separate servers want to share a secret key via an insecure link. The main novelty of this paper is security proof of the proposed protocol in the random oracle model. The security proof argues the security attributes of the proposed protocol.
INTRODUCTION
In public key cryptosystems, each user has a private key and a corresponding public key. The main problem in this field is how establishing a link between user's identity (ID) and her/his public key. A general solution for this problem is based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), defined in ISO/IEC 9594-8 [1] , in which a trust authority, called Certificate Authority (CA), issues a certificate contained user's ID and user's public key signed with his/her private key. Because issuing and using the certificate are costly, another solution named Identity Based Cryptography (IBC), defined in IEEE P1636.3™/D1 [2] , has been proposed.
The IBC idea was first proposed by Shamir in 1984 [3] . In an IBC system, the user's ID is considered as her/his public key and the uses' private key are generated by a trusted authority, called Key Generation Center (KGC) or Private Key Generation (PKG). The main advantage of the IBC systems is that unlike PKI systems, issuing a certificate for each user is not required because there is an inherent link between user's ID and her/his public key.
In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [4] provided the first fully functional solution for ID-based encryption (IBE) using bilinear pairings. Since then, numerous ID-based authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed based on bilinear pairings (e.g., [5, 6, 7, 8] ). In the identity-based cryptosystems, users acquire their private key from the PKG. A single PKG may be responsible for issuing private keys to members of a small-scale organization, but it is unrealistic to assume that a single PKG will be responsible for issuing private keys to members of different organizations, let alone the entire nations or the entire world. Furthermore, it is also unrealistic to assume that different PKGs will share common system parameters and differ only in the master key as done by Chen and Kudla [5] . Therefore, it is needed to consider the multiple PKG environment where all the PKGs use different system parameters. In 2005, Lee et al. proposed ID-based 2-party and tripartite AK protocol for this setting [9] . However, Kim et al. showed that, this protocol have a serious flaw that allows attackers to impersonate others freely and proposed modifications to the protocol [10] .
On performance, according to the results in [11, 12] , one bilinear pairing operation requires several times more multiplications in the underlying finite field than an elliptic curve point scalar multiplication does in the same finite field. For low-power devices such as sensors, cell phones and lowend PDAs, which are usually characterized by limited battery lifetime and low computational power, applications using bilinear pairings can be too expensive to implement. To solve the problems which appear due to the bilinear pairings, IBC systems based on elliptic curves have been introduced and developed in various areas including key agreement protocols (e.g. [13, 14, 15] ).
The contribution of this article is to construct a separate-PKG type identity based key agreement protocol which does not utilize bilinear pairings, but it uses elliptic curves which is an appropriate choice for low-power and low-memory cryptographic devices. The separate-PKG property allows users of different networks to share a secret key for using in next secure communications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 focuses on the mathematical background of elliptic curves and the security model of the key agreement protocols. In Section 3 we propose an ID-based key agreement protocol without pairing for separate KGCs and prove its security in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Elliptic Curves
B. Security model of key agreement protocols
We now review the formal security model for ID-based authenticated key agreement protocols due to Chen, Cheng and Smart [16] which is an adapted version of Blake-Wilson et al's model [17] . In the model, each party involved in a session is treated as an oracle, and an adversary can access the oracle by issuing any specified queries (defined later). An oracle
denotes the s-th instance of the party i involved with a partner party j in a session. The security of a protocol is defined by a game with two phases. In the first phase, an adversary E is allowed to issue the following queries in any order: Π , which has had a matching conversation to
Send
Definition of the security in the model depends on the notion of matching conversations. As mentioned in [16] , two oracles have matching conversations to each other if they have the same session identifier which consists of a concatenation of the messages exchanged between them. Definition 2. A secure authenticated key (AK) agreement protocol is defined as follows: A protocol is a secure AK if:
1. In the presence of a benign adversary, which faithfully conveys messages, on 
III. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
An ID-based key agreement protocol between users of separate KGCs is defined in terms of three algorithms system setup, key generation and key agreement.
A. System Setup
On input κ 1 , this algorithm outputs params , a set of system parameters. Basically, this is similar to that of Cao, Kou and Du's work [14] . However, in our system, there are total n different KGCs, which do not share common system parameters. Therefore, each KGC i must configure its parameters as follows:
and determines the tuple
2. Chooses two cryptographic secure hash functions
3. Chooses its master key
and compute the system public key
as system parameters and keeps the master key
B. Key Generation
Key generation is a key derivation algorithm that on system parameters, master key, and the user's identifier and returns the user's ID-based long-term key. With this algorithm, each i KGC works as follows for each user U with the identifier U ID :
The user's private key is U s and is transmitted to U via a secure channel. U can verify his/her private key by checking
C. Key Agreement
Two users A and B of two separate KGCs establish an authenticated secret key as follows:
A chooses two random numbers
and computes
(1) (1) Step3. Upon receiving the message from B , A computes the shared secrets as follow:
Finally A computes a session key with a general one-way hash function like SHA-2 as follows:
Step4. Upon receiving the message from A , B also computes the shared secret keys as follow:
Finally B also computes a session key with a general oneway hash function like SHA-2 as follows:
The protocol is a secure AK, provided the CDH assumption holds and the hash function H is modeled as a random oracle.
Proof. The first condition in Definition 2 follows from the assumption that the two oracles follow the protocol and E is benign. In this case, for our protocol it is clear that, both oracles accept holding the same session key because 
is the transcript of the oracle so far;
are random integers used by the oracle to generate messages, 
, then S treats according to the protocol.
• Otherwise, S responds with the tuple from the list to E ; otherwise, S proceeds in the following way to respond:
• Get the tuple of the oracle
• 
is not in the list, then S selects a random number
, responds it to E and inserts the
o Otherwise (i.e. the tuple
is in the list H L ), S proceeds as follows:
 If the existing tuple in H L is of the form
h to E and updates the list Reveal L .
, responds it to E and updates the list Reveal L .
 If those hold, S responds u h to E and replaces the tuple 
. To respond, S first looks through to the list H L ; if it previously is queried, S responds u h from the list to E ; otherwise, S Looks through to Reveal L and proceeds in the following way to respond:
• If the tuple } , , , , , { (2) ) ( (1) ) ( (2) ) ( (2) ) ( (1) ) ( (2) ) ( (1) ) ( 
, responds it to E and inserts the tuple . Now, the simulator S for solving the CDH problem proceeds as follows:
The shared secret of the Test oracle 
Therefore,
is number of elements of the list H L . Thus, for computing the above probability,
should be computed. Assume that the event A is " The adversary wins the game". Therefore, the probability is computed as follows: 
Equations (4) and (5) 
Moreover, we know that
Then, Equations (6) and (7) is a non-negligible function, the probability of solving the CDH problem by the simulator S also is non-negligible and this fulfills the proof. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this article we proposed a new identity based key agreement protocol based on elliptic curves between two users supported by separate PKGs that have independent system parameters. Then, we proved the security of the protocol in the random oracle model by an extended version of Blake-Wilson et al's model. Using elliptic curves causes the protocol to be compatible with low-power and lightweight devices, and the property of multi PKGs, enables users of different organizations to share secret keys and establishes a secure communication.
